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ABSTRACT
The visual perspective-taking ability of 4 chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) was investigated. The subjects
chose between information about the location of hidden food provided by 2 experimenters who randomly
alternated between two roles (the guesser and the knower). The knower baited 1 of 4 obscured cups so
that the subjects could watch the process but could not see which of the cups contained the reward. The
guesser waited outside the room until the food was hidden. Finally, the knower pointed to the correct cup
while the guesser pointed to an incorrect one. The chimpanzees quickly learned to respond to the
knower. They also showed transfer to a novel variation of the task, in which the guesser remained inside
the room and covered his head while the knower stood next to him and watched a third experimenter bait
the cups. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that chimpanzees are capable of modeling the
visual perspectives of others.

Despite the recent resurgence of interest in primate social intelligence, there is still little empirical
evidence that nonhuman primates possess the attributional capacities that some investigators suggest
may motivate much of their behavior (e.g., Humphrey, 1980; Whiten & Byrne, 1988). Primates do appear
to know much more about their own social systems than we had previously suspected (Cheney, Seyfarth,
& Smuts, 1986). They also appear to be capable of sophisticated forms of behavior that lead to
manipulation and deception of others (Whiten & Byrne, 1988). For example, during Rummer's (1967)
early work with hamadryas baboons, he witnessed females presenting and glancing at males while
threatening rival females. He speculated that one possible function of this behavior was to manipulate the
males into attacking the challenging females. Bachmann and Rummer (1980) later reported experimental
evidence that males of the same species were able to judge the quality of newly established male-female
pairs and then use that assessment to decide whether to intervene and attempt to lead the females away.
Smuts (1986) recently provided intriguing preliminary evidence that after aggressive encounters with
more dominant animals, savanna baboons may wait to retaliate surreptitiously and selectively against the
relatively subordinate companions of that animal. Despite such sophisticated social maneuvering, do
most primates possess a capacity to represent the mental states of others? As Premack and Woodruff
(1978) put it, do they have an ability that allows them to make inferences about the intentions, desires,
and states of mind of others?

Given the difficulties of devising experimental methods applicable to addressing these questions in the
field, Whiten and Byrne (1988) set about the task of trying to develop a taxonomy of mind by collating a
vast array of anecdotal descriptions of primate deception (e.g., deWaal, 1986). As did Humphrey (1980),
they described primates as natural psychologists, capable of representing the mental states of each other
and using these representations to deceive others. One example cited by Whiten and Byrne is the
observation by field-workers of subordinate males of a variety of species that carefully adjusted their
behavior to allow them to copulate with females while out of sight of dominant males. The interpretation
they favor is not simply that the subordinates have learned through aversive trial-and-error learning to
avoid mating with females when dominant males are visible but rather that the subordinate males have a
representation of the knowledge possessed by the dominant ones. If true, this implies that the
subordinate males have a causal theory of knowledge of the type that allows them to make the following
inference: If I am able to get out of sight of the dominant animal, then it will not be able to see me,
therefore that male will not know that I am mating with this female.
Such an understanding requires a capacity for visual perspective taking, the ability to understand how
objects and events may appear from another's perspective. It also requires the ability to understand that a
different visual perspective may lead another animal to possess a different state of knowledge than
oneself (Premack, 1988). The development of these abilities in human infants has been well documented
(Borke, 1971; Lempers, Ravell, & Flavell, 1977; Masangkay et al., 1974; Mossier, Marvin, & Greenberg,
1976; Wimmer, Hogrefe, & Perner, 1988; Zahn-Waxier, Radke-Yarrow, & Brady-Smith, 1977). In contrast,
comparable experiments with nonhuman primates have not yet been conducted. Thus, it remains very
possible that simpler mechanisms may account for the behaviors isolated by Whiten and Byrne (1988) as
evidence of what they refer to as mind-reading (Cheney et al., 1986; Mitchell, 1986). However, despite
the absence of comparative, empirical investigations directly focused on the issue of perspective taking,
there have been a number of previous efforts to investigate directly related aspects of these issues in
nonhuman primates.
In a series of experiments with a group of young chimpanzees in a large outdoor enclosure, Menzel
(1974) explored aspects of leadership and communication. He was able to demonstrate that
chimpanzees who were shown the location of hidden food by human experimenters were successful in
attracting naive chimpanzees to follow them to the location of the reward. These leaders used a variety of
methods to entice the other chimpanzees into following them, including tapping them on the shoulder,
repeatedly glancing at them while heading in the direction of the food, and "in the extreme case,
screaming, grabbing a preferred companion, and dragging him in the direction of the food" (Menzel, 1974,
p. 115). Later, the followers seemed to know which animal best knew the location of the food and readily
followed that animal to the correct spot. Although it seems clear that the followers were responding to
direct cues from the leader's behavior (Menzel, 1974), it is also possible that the followers were able to
make fairly accurate inferences about the probable state of knowledge of the leader on the basis of the
separate experiences that they had been given. Of course, there is no way of knowing if the naive
chimpanzees actually understood the exact nature of the visual experience that the leaders had been
given, but this series of experiments suggests an ability in chimpanzees to understand that some
individual animals possess specific states of knowledge not shared by others.
Premack and Woodruff (1978) explored the attributional ability of a chimpanzee named Sarah. Sarah was
allowed to watch videotapes in which human actors tried to solve staged problems. After she was
familiarized with a particular videotape, she was given pairs of still photos, one of which represented a
solution to the problem. Premack and Woodruff reported that on a wide variety of problems, Sarah
correctly selected from the photos the alternative that depicted the solution to the problem with which the
actor had been confronted. They argued that her ability to interpret the scenes in the tapes as problems

to be solved by the actor (inferred from her choice of the correct solutions) required a capacity to make
inferences about the intentions of the actors. Like humans, they speculated, chimpanzees may have a
theory of mind, an ability to impute mental states to others. In this instance Premack and Woodruff
believed that Sarah had demonstrated that she was capable of guessing about the intentions and desires
of others. At the time, they also speculated that if chimpanzees are capable of attributing intentions to
others, then they may also be capable of making inferences about other mental states, such as guessing
and knowing, and suggested some preliminary ways to address this problem. To date, however, the
results of such studies have not been published, although some have been noted briefly by Premack
(1988).
Another effort to explore the attributional ability of primates has been made by Gallup (1982, 1983, 1985)
who has sketched a broad, comparative approach to understanding the emergence of self-awareness
and its potential cognitive byproducts. The ability of chimpanzees to recognize themselves in mirrors was
first demonstrated by Gallup (1970), and later reports have confirmed and extended his findings of an
inability for gorillas, lesser apes, all species of monkeys tested thus far, and a variety of other animals to
do the same (for reviews see Anderson, 1984; Povinelli, 1987). Gallup (1975) has argued that selfrecognition is an empirical measure of self-awareness, or the ability of an organism to become the object
of its own attention. More recently, Gallup (1983) has pursued these findings further and has predicted,
on the basis of their shared capacity for self-recognition, that chimpanzees and orangutans (like humans)
ought to be capable of using their own self-knowledge to make guesses about the self-knowledge of
others. Many introspectively based social behaviors (intentional deception, sorrow, grief, empathy, etc.)
are believed to develop from the use of one's own experiences to make inferences about the probable
experiences that others have under similar conditions (Gallup, 1985). On the other hand, monkeys, for
example, are predicted to lack this ability because of their apparent inability to recognize their own selfimages. Hence, Gallup speculated that they do not have a sufficiently well-developed self-concept to
support complex inferences about the mental states of others (Gallup, 1983).
Premack (1988) recently stressed the necessity of careful, experimental analyses of these issues if
researchers are ever to have closure on the possibility that chimpanzees may possess a theory of mind
and on the scope of attributions that they might be capable of making. There are other reasons for
developing methodological approaches for addressing these issues aside from mapping the cognitive
abilities of chimpanzees. One is to assess the plausibility of the interpretation of social manipulation by
primates that Whiten and Byrne (1988) offered. Another reason is that the comparative application of
such methodologies will eventually allow us to test more global theories that predict qualitative differences
in these abilities among different phyletic groups (Gallup, 1983).
As part of a larger project to evaluate Gallup's (1983) model of the expected distribution of mind in
primates, we investigated the possibility that chimpanzees are capable of modeling and understanding
the consequences of the visual experiences of others. Our experimental design was inspired by
investigations of the onset of this capacity in human children (i.e., Wimmer et al., 1988) and by Premack
and Woodruffs (1978) discussion about the distinction between guessing and knowing as different mental
states. In light of such efforts, we reasoned that if chimpanzees were given the opportunity to watch two
persons, one of whom witnessed an event occur, and another who did not, it might be possible to
determine what they knew about the relative knowledge possessed by each of them. Here we report
evidence that chimpanzees may be capable of visual perspective taking and possibly of using this ability
to differentiate between guessing and knowing. The results are discussed in the context of comparable
abilities in human children and the potential for future research.

Method
Subjects and Housing
The subjects were 4 chimpanzees (Fan troglodytes) housed at the Primate Cognition Project of the Ohio
State University. At the time of the study, Sheba was 7 years old, Kermit, 9 years, Darrell, 9'/2 years, and
Sarah, 28 years. Sheba, Darrell, and Kermit had been part of a variety of previous investigations related
to learning and cognition including one-to-one correspondence, color discriminations, the use of colors as
attributes, drawing (Boysen, Berntson, & Prentice, 1987), cross-modal discriminations, same-different
concepts, and numerical competence (Boysen & Berntson, 1989). Sarah arrived at the project 1 year
before the beginning of the current study. Before her arrival at the Primate Cognition Project, she had
been the subject of over 2 decades of cognitive studies, including linguistic abilities (Premack, 1986),
primitive mathematical concepts (Woodruff & Premack, 1981), and attributional abilities (Premack &
Woodruff, 1978). All subjects were equally familiar with the two experimenters who alternated between
the roles described later.
Apparatus
The apparatus used in this investigation was a modified version of a communication apparatus designed
by Mason and Hollis (1962). As they did, we refer to one side of the apparatus as the informant side and
the other as the operator side. The operator side had four handles that controlled the movement of four
paired food trays. When one of the handles was pulled, the corresponding pair of trays moved in opposite
directions to within reach of the participants (Figure 1), The informant side had no such handles, which
prevented the participants on this side from controlling the operation of the trays. In this study a
removable, opaque plastic food cup was placed upside-down inside each of the eight trays, thus
concealing its contents from direct view.

Figure 1. Communication apparatus. (The four pairs of food trays, each covered by an inverted food cup,
were controlled by pulling on handles on the far, operator side of the apparatus.)

Figure 2. The guesser exits the room.

Procedure
Immediately before this study, all subjects participated in a cooperative role-reversal study with the same
apparatus (Povinelli, Boysen, & Nelson, 1989). During the course of that experiment, all subjects had
learned to point to baited food cups inside the trays and to respond to pointing by an experimenter by
pulling the correct handle. In Phase 1 of the study, individual subjects sat on the operator side of the
apparatus while inside their home cages. Thus, they had access to the four handles that controlled the
movement of the trays. The opaque, plastic cups were placed inside all of the empty food trays while the
subject watched. Three experimenters participated in the study. One experimenter always operated a
removable cardboard hood that covered the food trays. The other two experimenters alternated between
two roles, the guesser and the knower. Following a randomized schedule, one of these two
experimenters assumed the role of the guesser and left the room while the subject and the other two
remaining experimenters remained inside (Figure 2). Next, a hood was placed over the food trays, which
prevented the subject but not the experimenters from seeing them. The experimenter who assumed the
role of the knower kneeled down and hid a food reward under one of the four cups under the hood either
before, during, or after several false baiting movements (Figure 3). During this baiting procedure the
subjects could clearly see the knower hiding the food but could not see which food cup it was placed
under. The knower then stood up, assumed a neutral posture in a predetermined location behind the
apparatus, and fixed his gaze on the front of the subject's cage. The guesser then re-entered the room. At
this time, both the guesser and the knower pointed to one of the four locations, and the hood was
removed by the other experimenter (Figure 4). The subjects then responded by pulling one of the handles
and displaced the cup from the food tray. If they chose the knower, they removed the food cup and
obtained the reward. If they chose either the guesser or another cup, they were told that they were wrong
and the knower generally indicated that he was correct by displacing the correct food cup, thus revealing
its contents. The knower always pointed to the correct location while the guesser always pointed to an
incorrect location. The location of food, position of the experimenters, and the incorrect location to which
the guesser pointed were all block randomized. The pointing routine had been extensively rehearsed to
standardize cues such as distance from the food cups, height and angle of arms and hands, and direction
of gaze for both pointers. The subjects received 10 trials per day with these procedures.

Figure 3. The knower hides the food in one of four food cups.

Figure 4. The knower and guesser point to baited and unbaited food cups.

Because the subjects' performances quickly stabilized, at the end of the 3rd week (for Kermit, the 4th
week), we altered the procedure by having the knower and the third experimenter wear small blue hats
while the baiting and pointing were taking place. One of these hats was conspicuously passed between
the two experimenters who played the roles of guesser and knower on each trial that their roles changed.
This was done in the hopes of improving the chimpanzees' performance by helping them to remember
who had been watching and who was out of the room. Although the addition of the hats did not appear to
have a noticeable effect on any of the subjects' performances, a transfer phase (Phase 2) was conducted
during which the hats were eliminated from the routine to verify this observation.

Finally, in order to evaluate what the chimpanzees had learned, a critical transfer phase (Phase 3) was
conducted. It consisted of 10 trials on 3 consecutive days in which three variables of the routine were
altered. Instead of the guesser's leaving the room and the knower's hiding the food, both the guesser and
the knower remained inside the room while the third experimenter hid the food, The guesser and knower
stood beside each other, behind the apparatus, and watched as the third experimenter prepared to hide
the food. However, just before the food was hidden the guesser placed a large paper bag over his head,
which prevented him from seeing where the food was being placed (Figure 5). After the baiting was
completed, the guesser lifted the bag off his head. Finally, the hood over the food cups was removed, and
the guesser and knower pointed as before. As in the previous phases, all variables were block
randomized.
Results
The results of Phase 1 (Figure 6) reveal that a consistent pattern quickly emerged for all of the subjects,
especially Sheba and Darrell. These 2 subjects quickly learned to respond to the information provided by
the knower most of the time, despite varying levels of incorrect choices for the guesser and other
unbaited trays to which no one was pointing. When the data from Phase 1 was summed across weeks, a
chi-square analysis revealed that the individual performances of all 4 subjects differed strongly from
chance (p < .001 or better). Given this overall effect, a chi-square analysis was then performed on each
subject's summed preference for the knower as compared with that for the guesser. All subjects showed
2
a significant preference for choosing the location to which the knower was pointing: Sheba, χ (1, N = 285)
2
2
= 27.79, p < .001; Darrell, χ (1, N = 291) = 14.52, p < .001; Kermit, χ (1, N = 288) = 20.05, p < .001; and
2
Sarah, χ (1, N = 229) = 8.07, p < .005. In addition to this overall effect, a further analysis of each subject's
preference for the knower rather than for the guesser in individual blocks of trials also revealed significant
effects. The statistically significant blocks of trials are indicated by the vertical dotted lines in Figure 6.
As a preliminary assessment of the learning that had occurred during Phase 1, we compared the
preferences of each subject for the guesser and knower on their first and last block of trials in this phase.
Interestingly, despite their preference for the knower, most of the subjects' scores improved only slightly
across the 6 weeks of this phase. Of the 3 subjects who appeared to have understood the essential
nature of the task (Darrell, Sheba, and Kermit), only Kermit's performance revealed a significant change
2
from the first to the last block of trials, χ (2, N = 50) = 10.97, p < .005. Thus, both Darrell and Sheba did
almost as well on their first block of trials as their last, despite the fact that their results did not reach
statistical significance until later (see Figure 6).
The hats were introduced into the routine at the end of Week 3 for Sheba, Darrell, and Sarah, and Week
4 for Kermit. This potential discriminative cue did not appear to have any noticeable effect on the animals'
performances, and their transfer into Phase 2 (during which the hats were eliminated) provides additional
support for this view. Kermit and Sheba did slightly better, and Darrell did slightly worse, but these
changes were minor and not statistically significant. Only Sarah's change in performance from the last
2
block of trials in Phase I to the single block in Phase 2 was significant, χ (2, N = 50) = 11.19, p < .005,
2
and, interestingly, revealed a clear preference for the knower, χ (1, N = 38) = 10.53, p < .001.
The results of Phase 3, in which the guesser covered his head while the food was hidden, showed no
decrease in performance for the 3 of the 4 subjects that clearly learned the previous task (Table 1).
Darrell, Sheba, and Kermit all responded to the knower significantly more often than the guesser (p < ,05
or better), despite the alteration of three critical variables in the experimental design (the presence of the
guesser, the nature of the visual obstruction that defined the guesser, and the identity of the person who
hid the food).

Figure 5. Novel procedure used in Phase 3: The guesser places a paper bag over his head during baiting
procedure.

Discussion
The hypothesis evaluated in this experiment was related to the perspective-taking abilities of
chimpanzees. In particular, we asked, are chimpanzees capable of modeling the visual experiences of
others? We reasoned that if they are, then they may also understand that there is a difference in
knowledge between someone who has seen an event occur and someone who has not and may use this
understanding for their own benefit. The chimpanzees' performances in this study provided preliminary
support for the existence of such an ability. We therefore adopt the working hypothesis that chimpanzees
are capable of visual perspective taking. In particular, the results support a specific implication of this
hypothesis, namely, that chimpanzees understand that someone who has seen an event occur has a
different state of knowledge about that event than someone who has not.
Before beginning this experiment we postulated two potential outcomes. First, it was possible that the
subjects would learn to discriminate between the guesser and the knower in Phases 1 and 2, but when
the novel routine was introduced in Phase 3, their scores would drop to chance levels. The other outcome
was similar to the first in that the learning would occur in Phases 1 and 2, but it differed in that the
subjects would show immediate transfer in Phase 3. At the outset we agreed to view the first possible
result as consistent with a more traditional learning theory account of the chimpanzees' performance.
Such an outcome may be plausibly explained by suggesting that the subjects had learned to use
discriminative cues, such as the person who remained in the room or the one who baited the cups, to
solve the problem. Given such results, it would be unnecessary to presume that the subjects had any
idea of the specific knowledge possessed by the knower. In contrast, we viewed the second possible
outcome as consistent with the view that the chimpanzees used attributional abilities to make an
inference about the differing states of knowledge of the guesser and knower on the basis of their different
visual experiences.

In feet, our results are most consistent with the second hypothesized outcome. Three of the 4 subjects
showed immediate transfer in the novel test situation during Phase 3. In addition, with the exception of
Kermit, there appeared to be little change in learning across the course of the experiment, which further
supports the view that the subjects came to understand the nature of the task early in Phase 1.
Although we were not aware of it at the time of this study, Premack (1988) independently shared the
same insight, which led him to create a very similar task for 4 juvenile chimpanzees. Unfortunately, the
formal results of his experiment have not been published, and thus it is not yet possible to know how his
results compare with ours. His design appears to have differed from ours in several important ways. For
example, only one of the trainers provided information about the location of the food. This was achieved
by tying a string to each trainer and allowing the subject to pull one of the trainers forward. This trainer
then pointed to one of the cups. The description Premack outlined suggests that 2 of his subjects
performed in a fashion similar to Darrell, Kermit, and Sheba, and did so within a mere 24 trials. This
suggests that forcing chimpanzees to choose between simultaneous, contradictory information (as in our
study) may hinder their ability to express their comprehension of the task. This may be due to the great
social force that pointing may exert on their behavior (Premack, 1986).
A more parsimonious interpretation of our results may be that the subjects were responding to cues
related to the intensity of the pointing of the guesser and knower from the very beginning. We view this as
unlikely for a variety of reasons. First, on a majority of trials, the subjects carefully tracked the movements
of the guesser and knower. Because of the counterbalanced nature of the pointing routine, it was often
necessary for the guesser and knower to cross paths as they moved into position. The chimpanzees
moved accordingly and generally correctly seated themselves in front of the knower before the pointing
had occurred. In addition, on a large portion of these trials, they grasped the wrong handle before the
hood was removed but then quickly corrected themselves once they were able to see exactly where the
knower was pointing. In other words, they appeared to select in advance the person they wished to
respond to and waited for the hood to be removed to see which food cup was correct Thus, the pointing
itself did not appear to be the variable that the subjects used to select the knower, but rather it appeared
to be the cue that the subjects used to ascertain the exact location of the food. In addition to these
observations, we also have empirical evidence from a subsequent experiment (with the same apparatus)
that even after 200 trials the subjects could not discriminate between intentionally misleading pointing by
an experimenter who had seen where the food was hidden and accurate pointing by the same person.
This is an important point because it strongly implies that unconscious cues, if present, played a minor
role in our results.
Even if such unconscious cues were relatively unimportant, this does not rule out the possibility that the
chimps learned other rules such as select the person who stays in the room or select the person who
hides the food. Indeed, we strongly suspect that they did learn these rules. Although such rules do not
require that the subjects understand the relation between seeing and knowing, they certainly play a part
in the behavior of any organisms, including humans, that do understand this causal relation. Unless one
first realizes that there are two conditions to which the guesser and knower are being subjected (inside
the room vs. outside the room or paper bag over the head vs. no paper bag over the head), there can be
no basis for making inferences about the state of knowledge that results from those conditions. The
recognition of such conditions alone may be an insufficient explanation of the results. The immediate
ability of the subjects to perform accurately when the paradigm was altered, combined with the relatively
weak learning curves in Phase 1, leads us to favor the hypothesis that chimpanzees, like young children,
believe that those who see an object or event have a different understanding of that object or event than
others who do not see it. However, like Premack and Woodruff (1978) and Gallup (1982), we recognize
that a single experiment cannot definitively establish the presence of such capacities. We do not regard

this as a trivial point, because no one experiment can clearly disentangle the effects of learning on the
subjects' behavior. Instead, convergent evidence is necessary to establish that a specific attributional
process is present.
Figure 6. Performance by subject across all three phases of the experiment. (The blocks of trials in which the
subjects showed a statistically significant preference, p < .05 or better, for responding to the knower are
indicated by the vertical dotted lines. Data is presented in blocks of 50 trials for Phases 1 and 2. Phase 3
consisted of 30 trials. Subjects were given 10 trials each day.)

Table 1. Results of Phase 3
Choice
Subject

Knower

Guesser

Other

Χ (1)
2

N

Darrell

19

8

3

4.48*

27

Kermit

21

8

1

5.82**

29

Sheba

20

9

1

4.16*

29

Sarah

13

10

7

0.26

23

Note. Each subject was given 30 trials. The chi-square comparisons are between choices for guesser and knower
only.
*p<.05. **p<.025.

One may reasonably wonder why, if chimpanzees understand that seeing leads to knowing, they continue
to choose the guesser at all. Even during the best block of performance by Kermit, the guesser was still
chosen one fourth of the time. In Phase 1, Darrell chose the knower 62% of the time and the guesser
38% of the time. This may either argue against their complete comprehension of the problem or point to
other factors that may account for their inability to always reject the information provided by the guesser.
Clearly, even if our working hypothesis is correct, it does not necessarily mean that a chimpanzee's
understanding of the causal nature of knowledge acquisition is equivalent in all respects to that of
humans. Current speculations about this differ. Premack (1988) envisioned that chimpanzees almost
certainly have a weaker theory of mind, capable of attributing only a small subset of the mental states that
humans are capable of projecting. Gallup (1983), on the other hand, predicted a more generalized
attributional capacity, which extends into many different domains. Regardless of the breadth of the
chimpanzee's attributional abilities, however, we offer the prediction that these abilities, if present, are
likely to be inherently less stable than those found in humans, in part because of attentional and
emotional differences between the two species. For example, we believe that Sarah's performance
resulted from the combined interaction of emotional and attentional processes on her understanding of
the task (i.e., perseveration biases, emotional reactivity when she was wrong, etc.). To a lesser degree,
these factors may have affected the performances of the other subjects as well.
One interesting aspect of the design of our experiment is that it not only addresses the issue of visual
perspective taking but also a more sophisticated issue of whether an animal is able to understand that
access to visual information leads to knowledge—the cognitive underpinnings of an ability to discriminate
between guessing and knowing. In this regard, most studies of human children have been restricted to
examinations of their visual perspective-taking abilities. Some form of visual perspective taking emerges
in young children by about 2 years of age (Lempers et al., 1977; Masangkay et al., 1974). This early
ability appears to be fairly restricted, however, merely allowing the infant to infer what object another
person can or cannot see (Lempers et al., 1977). Only later, by about 4 years of age, do children begin to
appreciate that the visual perspective of another determines how that object appears to them. That is, a
second developmental stage emerges that enables children to make more complete and detailed
inferences about the visual perspectives of others (Flavell, 1974; Lempers et al., 1977; Masangkay et al.,
1974).
More recently, there have been attempts to determine at what age children come to understand that
access to information leads to knowledge or at what age the child develops a causal theory of knowledge
acquisition. Wimmer et al. (1988) reported that children do not fully understand visual informational
access as a source of knowledge until they are 4 years old. They discovered that at 3 years of age most
children did not consider another person's visual informational access in assessing what that person
knew or did not know. The task in this experiment may have required such an ability because the subjects
were asked to judge between a person who had visual access to a specific piece of information and one
who did not. Thus, one implication of our working hypothesis is that the chimpanzees were using
attributional abilities that begin to develop in human children sometime between 3 and 4 years of age.
Unfortunately, there have been no experimental studies in which children have been required to make a
simultaneous discrimination between guessing and knowing in others. However, an analysis of the use of
the words guess and know by preschool children has revealed that these terms are not fully understood
until about age 4 (Misciones, Marvin, O'Brien, & Greenberg, 1978). A replication of this experiment with
young children may be useful for purposes of clarifying the chimpanzees' performance.
A question left unresolved by our study is to what extent the chimpanzees were capable of understanding
the concept of guessing. Although they clearly responded preferentially to the knower, their
comprehension of what the guesser was doing remains uncertain. If the subjects did make an attribution

about the guesser's state of knowledge, they may have either concluded that he did not know where the
food was hidden (which, of course, is untrue), or they may have believed that he did know but was
intentionally misinforming them. There is some precedent for believing that chimpanzees are capable of
understanding that they are being deceived (Woodruff & Premack, 1979), and we are currently analyzing
the results of a subsequent experiment we conducted to help to distinguish between these possibilities. At
present, we recognize that our use of the term guesser is merely a suggestive gloss for the role of the
experimenter who pointed to the incorrect location.
Even though the results of this study support the emerging body of evidence that chimpanzees are
capable of making at least some inferences about the mental states of others, we believe the best
method for resolving these issues is a convergent and comparative one. In fact, this experiment only
addresses a small subset of the question of attributional abilities of primates, specifically, the relation
between seeing and knowing and the distinction between guessing and knowing. There are clearly many
other dimensions to this general phenomenon, not all of which hinge on determining if the chimpanzee
understands the sources of private knowledge as we have approached the issue in this study. For
example, if chimpanzees do possess a theory of mind, they may attribute responsibility to others for
intentional actions, but not accidental ones, in much the same fashion as do 3-year-old human children
(Yuill & Perner, 1988). We are currently investigating this possibility by examining the chimpanzees'
responses to two classes of actors, those who accidentally cause something undesirable to happen, and
those who cause the same thing to happen on purpose.
Psychologists interested in the development of attributional capacities in human infants have made
considerable and intriguing progress, and in principle, there is no reason why these approaches cannot
be modified to study the nature of animal cognition as well. Granted, the essential questions cannot be
answered by simply asking the animals what they think (as we can with children), but creative
approaches can be developed to pose equivalent questions that allow the subjects to express what they
know through their behavior. The problem is a difficult one and requires that a careful balance be struck
between identifying the objective cues that must necessarily support even the most complex attributional
processes and ensuring that these cues are not sufficient to produce the behaviors in question. However,
an approach that constructs and empirically evaluates theories that make explicit predictions about
behavior depending on the presence or absence of specific attributional capacities is a critical point of
departure. Only after such investigations have been completed will it be possible to evaluate the validity
of alternative approaches that rely on detailed anecdotes as evidence of attributional abilities (Whiten &
Byrne, 1988) and of others that argue such issues are largely irrelevant (Epstein, Lanza, & Skinner, 1981;
Skinner, 1987).
One model that explicitly predicts dramatic differences between apes and humans, on the one hand, and
monkeys, on the other, in experiments similar to ours already exists (Gallup, 1983). Studies are currently
underway to address these predictions by attempting to replicate our findings with rhesus macaques. A
comparative application of such experimental methods offers the hope of eventually characterizing the
distribution of attributional abilities in nonhuman primates.
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